

AMENDMENTS TO THE SPECIFICATION

Please replace paragraph [0050] with the following amended paragraph.

[0050] The content publisher generates the sharing polynomial $f(x)$ over a finite field Z_N where $a_0 = SK$. Although polynomial interpolation is described, other collections of functions may also be utilized. Each partial secret share S_i may then be calculated using Equation (3), which is shown as follows:

$$S_i = f(id_i) \bmod N \phi(N) \quad (3)$$

where N is a RSA modulus and $\phi(N)$ is a Euler totient function.

Please replace paragraph [0053] with the following amended paragraph.

[0053] At block 514, for instance, the content publisher may broadcast k public witnesses of the sharing polynomial's coefficients, which are denoted as $\{g^{a_0}, \dots, g^{a_{k-1}}\}$, where $g \in Z_N$, $g \in Z_N^*$. After broadcast, the content publisher may destroy the polynomial.

At block 516, each license authority id_i verifies validity of the received partial secret share. Validity may be checked by determining if Equation (4), as shown below, holds for the received partial secret share S_i utilizing the sharing polynomial's coefficients which were broadcast at block 514:

$$g^{S_i} = g^{a_0} \cdot (g^{a_1})^{id_i} \cdot \dots \cdot (g^{a_{k-1}})^{id_i^{k-1}} \pmod{N} \quad (4)$$

1 In this way, each license authority id_i , may verify the validity of the received partial
2 secret share S_i without exposing or knowing the secret, i.e. the private key SK .
3

4 Please replace paragraph [0063] with the following amended paragraph.

5 [0063] At block 620, the content player, when executed by the client device, determines if
6 k correct partial licenses have been received by validating each of the partial licenses.
7 The partial licenses may be validated as follows. First, node p calculates

$$9 g^{S_i} = g^{a_0} \cdot (g^{a_1})^{id_i} \cdot \dots \cdot (g^{a_{k-1}})^{id_i^{k-1}} \pmod{N} \quad (7)$$

11 from the public witnesses of the sharing polynomial's coefficients, as was described in
12 relation to block 516 of FIG. 5 and Equation (4). Equation (6) is then applied to g^{S_i} and
13 the received partial license $prel_i$, A_1 , and A_2 to calculate c . The received partial license
14 $prel_i$ is verified by checking if the following equations hold: $g^r \cdot (g^{S_i})^c = A_1$
15 and $prel^r \cdot (prel_i)^c = A_2$. The above steps are repeated until the node p obtains k valid
16 partial licenses. If k valid partial licenses cannot be obtained, generation of the formal-
17 license fails (block 622).

19 Please replace paragraph [0064] with the following amended paragraph.

21 [0064] If k valid partial licenses are obtained, then at block 624, the content player
22 combines the partial licenses to form the formal license. For example, the node p uses
23 the k valid partial results to calculate the formal license utilizing Equation (8):

$$\begin{aligned}
1 \quad license &= \prod_i (prel_i)^{l_{id_i}(0)} = (prel)^{\sum_i S_i \cdot l_{id_i}(0)} \\
2 \quad &= (prel)^{SK} = ((license)^{PK})^{SK} \bmod N,
\end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

$$4 \quad \text{where } l_{id_i}(x) = \prod_{j=1, j \neq i}^k \frac{x - id_j}{id_i - id_j}.$$

7 Please replace paragraph [0075] with the following amended paragraph.

8 [0075] At periodic intervals, for example, the license authorities may update their
9 respective shares of the private key SK through execution of the respective update
10 module 222 of FIG. 2. At block 802, each license authority i generates a random (k, m)
11 sharing of the secret θ using a random update polynomial $f_{i, update}(x)$, as shown in
12 Equation (9):

$$15 \quad f_{i, update}(x) = b_{i,1}x + \dots + b_{i,k-1}x^{k-1} \bmod N \tag{9}$$